Summary. The concept of the reservation wage has played an important role in labour market theory, particularly in models of job search, labour supply and labour market participation. We focus on the determinants of reservation wages, with a particular focus on health, which has attracted very little attention despite its importance from a policy perspective. Using UK data we estimate an endogenous switching model which predicts reservation wages for the unemployed and market wages for the employed. Our results have important policy implications since they suggest that poor health is a major cause of economic inactivity.
Introduction
The relationship between health and labour market outcomes, such as participation and wages, is the subject of a growing literature fed by the increasing availability of longitudinal data sets that contain rich information on individuals' health as well as labour market status and a host of other sociodemographic variables. Attempting to estimate the causal effect of health on labour market outcomes is complex because health and work are jointly determined (Adams et al., 2003) . In addition, issues such as selection into economic activity and justification bias in selfreported health require multiple econometric solutions to obtain meaningful estimates of the true causal effects of health status. It is therefore very encouraging to see the normally disparate literatures of health economics and labour economics come together to tackle an issue which is of key policy relevance. Although considerable progress in understanding the relationship between health and the labour market has been made via both theoretical and empirical work (e.g. Cooper et al. (2008) , Adams et al. (2003) and Stern (1989) ), our study is motivated by an important gap in the existing literature. The two disciplines of health and labour economics do not yet seem to have met around the concept of the reservation wage.
The reservation wage is the lowest wage at which an individual is willing to work, and this concept has played an important role in labour market theory. In particular, the reservation wage is central to theoretical models of job search, labour supply and labour market participation (see, for example, Mortensen (1986) ). Despite the key role that is played by the reservation wage in labour market theory, there is a shortage of empirical research which explores the setting of reservation wages at the individual level, and this may be due to a scarcity of data relating to reservation wages. Much of the existing literature tends to focus on how reservation wages affect the duration of unemployment; see, for example, Lancaster and Chesher (1983) , Addison et al. (2010) and Blackaby et al. (2007) . There are, however, theoretical reasons for expecting reservation wages to be influenced by the individual's state of health. Individuals in poor health are expected to have a higher reservation wage, reflecting their greater disutility of work. This has direct policy consequences in relation to the increasing numbers of individuals in Europe who are classified as economically inactive owing to health problems.
In this paper, we consider the determinants of reservation wages, with a particular focus on health, which has attracted very little attention in the existing empirical literature despite its importance from a policy perspective. We exploit the fact that the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) includes information on the stated reservation wages of unemployed as well as the market wages of employed individuals (see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/). We use an endogenous switching model to estimate simultaneously the probability of being employed versus unemployed alongside the continuous wage outcomes for each group. Of particular importance is the fact that we can explore different definitions of labour market participation. Blackaby et al. (2003 Blackaby et al. ( , 2004 argued that the economically inactive are a very diverse group who vary in their level of labour market attachment, and some of those traditionally labelled as inactive (or not participating) do want to work. Their analysis of pooled data from the UK Labour Force Survey indicates that only around 70% of the inactive are neither seeking work nor want to work.
Ideally we want to distinguish between those who are attached to the labour market (regardless of whether or not they are working at the time) and those who have very weak or no attachment; the former group are participating in the labour market and the latter group are not. We use two alternative definitions of participation, which rest on differential classifications of the unemployed, based on a self-reported labour market status variable. In the first, the economically active (participants) are those who are employed or who are unemployed but want to work, and the inactive group (non-participants) includes individuals who are long term sick and disabled, retired before statutory retirement age, in full-time education, engaged in family care or on a government training scheme. The assumption is that this latter group has much weaker labour market attachment than the former. This classification is different from most of the previous literature where it is more common either to exclude the inactive group or to include them in the same group as those unemployed individuals who are actively seeking work (see for example Jones (2006) , Campolieti (2002) and Kidd et al. (2000) ). For some of the group classified as non-participants by this first definition we do have information on their stated reservation wage, and this could signify some attachment to the labour market despite their self-reported labour market status. So, for our alternative definition, we classify this subgroup as unemployed and therefore include them with the economically active; thus our unemployed group in the second definition is larger than in the first. We explore the robustness of our empirical findings to this alternative distinction. Our econometric analysis also attempts to deal with the endogeneity of health in models of labour market outcomes.
Our results reveal no effect of health on the market wages of the employed, and we find no evidence for the argument that has appeared in some papers (e.g. Walker and Thompson (1996) and Gordon and Blinder (1980) ) that those with health problems will have higher reservation wages. Instead our results suggest that the main role of poor health is to weaken labour force attachment. Health is a significant determinant of whether or not the individual is attached to the labour market, regardless of which definition of unemployment we use, but, contrary to much of the previous work, once we account for selection into the labour market we do not find that health affects the probability of being unemployed.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous work in this area; Section 3 explains our endogenous switching method, our models for health and treatment of selection into labour market activity; Section 4 describes the data and variables; Section 5 presents the results; Section 6 explains their relevance and concludes.
Previous literature
Analysis of the relationship between health and labour market outcomes is theoretically grounded in the concept of human capital investment. Although much of the early human capital literature focused on the returns to education (see Mincer 1958) ), increasingly health has also been recognized as a component of human capital; Becker (1962) and Mushkin (1962) are two of the earliest studies, and a major theoretical contribution was made by Grossman's (1972) model of the demand for health capital. Early empirical studies identify important effects of health on labour market participation and wages (Grossman and Benham, 1973; Luft, 1975; Bartel and Taubman, 1979; Berkowitz et al., 1983) . However, these studies were usually limited by cross-sectional data, which made it difficult to disentangle the complex interrelationships (see Section 3.1). More recently, the increased availability of panel data sets with rich information on health and socio-economic indicators means that the literature on health status and labour market outcomes, such as participation and earnings, has gained momentum.
One strand of the literature has focused on the implications of disability rather than health for labour market outcomes. In the USA, Haveman et al. (1994) used eight waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to consider the effect of work limiting disability on working time and wages. They found that disability has a significantly negative effect on both outcomes and that this effect is larger once they have accounted for the endogeneity of health. For the UK, Walker and Thompson (1996) used the first three waves of the BHPS and found that, after controlling for the endogeneity of schooling, disability has a greater effect on labour market participation than on wages. In a similar vein, Kidd et al. (2000) compared the labour market outcomes of disabled and able-bodied men in the UK and found substantial wage and participation rate differences between the two groups with the disabled characterized by lower wages and lower rates of participation with productivity-related characteristics explaining approximately 50% of the differentials. More recently, Jones (2006) stated that, although the average wages of the disabled are over 85% of their non-disabled counterparts, the rate of participation of disabled people is approximately half that of the non-disabled. Similarly Jones et al. (2006b) focused on how disability has affected labour market outcomes by gender since the introduction of the Disability Discrimination Act in 1995 and found differences in employment and wage prospects for those with mental health problems.
For the UK, Contoyannis and Rice (2001) used the first six waves of the BHPS to explore the effect of self-assessed general and psychological health, rather than disability, on wages in the UK and found that reduced psychological health reduces hourly wages for men and that excellent self-assessed health (SAH) increases hourly wages for women. Several reasons have been put forward to explain why health may influence wages (see Contoyannis and Rice (2001) ). For example, increased health may increase productivity and wages may rise accordingly. Employers may believe that health is correlated with unobserved characteristics which are positively associated with productivity or employers may simply discriminate against individuals who are perceived to be in poor health. Pelkowski and Berger (2004) used data from the US Health and Retirement Survey to distinguish between the effects of temporary and permanent health problems. They found that permanent health problems have a significant effect on participation, wages and hours for both men and women.
In sum, the existing literature suggests that poor health is associated with lower rates of participation and, if employed, lower wages. As argued by Cai and Kalb (2006) , if poor health leads to lower potential earnings, regardless of whether this is due to low productivity or employer discrimination, the opportunity cost of leisure falls, i.e. the foregone value of extra earnings made from an additional hour of work falls and this impinges on willingness to participate in the labour market. In addition, high reservation wages may reflect benefit income that is associated with the disability, thereby increasing the replacement ratio, i.e. the ratio of benefit income to the market wage (Layard et al., 1994) . Alternatively, individuals in poor health may value leisure time (i.e. time to look after one's health) more highly or the disutility that is associated with work may be high owing to additional time or effort associated with working, which may lead to an increase in the individual's reservation wage. Hence, as argued by Jones (2006) , low rates of participation may partly reflect high reservation wages associated with poor health and/or certain types of disability.
Despite hints in the literature about the potential role of reservation wages, to our knowledge there is only one existing empirical study that focuses on the role of health in determining reservation wages. Gordon and Blinder (1980) used US data from the early 1970s to study the retirement decisions of white men aged 58-67 years. They hypothesize that an individual retires when his reservation wage exceeds his market wage, acknowledging that failing health in old age may make work more difficult and/or less remunerative. Their results suggest that health impacts significantly positively on the reservation wage and negatively on the market wage. However, the health information that was used was very limited and was assumed to be exogenous in their model, which they acknowledged probably results in a large upward bias in their estimates of the effect of health on wages.
Methodology

Health and labour market outcomes
Three sources of potential endogeneity exist when attempting to estimate the causal effect of health status on labour market outcomes. Firstly, there is true simultaneity between health and labour market outcomes, since, although health may affect productivity and in turn wages, also labour market status may have a direct effect on health. Secondly, it is likely that unobserved effects on both health and labour market outcomes are correlated; for example, those individuals who have a psychological disposition towards high levels of motivation may have higher labour market rewards and maintain better psychological health. Thirdly, in common with much of the empirical literature we are using self-reported health measures, and these are subject to reporting bias and measurement error. Labour market status might have a direct effect on this own health perception as distinct from actual health status. People may have financial and social incentives to report poor health to justify their labour market status (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Kreider, 1999) . Also SAH measures are based on subjective judgements which may not be comparable across individuals (Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2009; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004) . Deschryvere (2004) termed the first two sources, direct simultaneity and correlated unobservables, type I endogeneity and the third of reporting bias and measurement error type II endogeneity. Whereas this second type will lead to downward bias in our estimate of the effects of health on labour market outcomes, the other effects will lead to upward bias (Bound, 1991) . The common assumption in the literature seems to be that the latter outweighs the former but Bound et al. (1995) pointed out that the empirical evidence is mixed.
Our approach to the problem of type II endogeneity is to extend a method that was first used by Stern (1989) and Bound (1991) . This uses specific measures of health by asking about a list of potential health problems as instruments for the ordinal SAH measure. The idea is that more objective measures are used to instrument the endogenous and potentially error ridden subjective health measure. Bound et al. (1995) suggested several reasons why it may not be appropriate to use information on health problems directly in a labour market participation model, not least because these may not be highly correlated with ability to work. We follow Bound et al. (1995) and Disney et al. (2006) in including socio-economic characteristics alongside health problems as predictors of SAH, and Campolieti (2002) took a similar approach. This is distinct from Rice et al. (2007) , who distinguished between health problems which are allowed to determine SAH and socio-economic variables which are assumed only to influence reporting bias. We then extend this approach by estimating a generalized ordered probit (GOP) model to allow for the fact that individuals with the same underlying level of health may apply different thresholds when reporting SAH and hence different ordered categories for similar positions on the assumed underlying continuous scale (Rice et al., 2007; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004; Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995) .
H Å it , the health state of individual i at time t, which is a wave of a panel, is assumed to be continuously varying though unobservable. It is modelled by
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Here the error terms ν it are assumed to be independent and have standard normal distributions with mean 0 and unit variance as in the conventional probit model. The X it is a column vector of observations on variables that are assumed to determine SAH, and reporting of SAH, which may vary over time, such as specific health problems and such socio-economic characteristics as age, educational attainment and income plus an element of 1 to accommodate an intercept. α is a row vector of parameters to be estimated. Owing to the panel nature of the data to control for individual time invariant effects, or what is often referred to as individual heterogeneity, we include a vector of additional covariates,X 1i , which is the individual level means over time of those of the X it that are not time invariant. An associated vector of parameters is denoted by θ. Following Mundlak (1978) and Martin and Smith (2003) this enables the estimator of α to be considered as an approximation to a standard panel fixed effects estimator with dummy variables for individuals rather than these means. It reduces the bias from type I endogeneity caused by correlation in the unobservable effects on health and labour market outcomes. For notational convenience we let the stacked vector {X it ,X 1i } = X Å it and {α, θ} = Υ. The health status that we do observe is an ordered categorization denoted by H it and takes values j = 0, 1, 2, 3, being poor or very poor, fair, good or very good and excellent health respectively. H it is related to its unobservable counterpart H Å it by assuming that H it = j if μ itj < H Å it < μ it,j+1 , where μ it0 = −∞, μ itj < μ it,j+1 and μ it4 = ∞. We note that the appropriate GOP approach assumes that the thresholds μ itj , j = 1, 2, 3, may differ for individuals when reporting their health status on a categorical scale and may also change for particular individuals over time. Thus this model relaxes the constancy of the threshold parameters across individual observations, which is a restriction of the standard probit model.
The model now specifies that μ itj = μ j + ω j Q it for j = 1, 2, 3, which has two elements: firstly a specific overall threshold parameter as in the standard probit model; secondly a component that consists of the influence of a vector of socio-economic factors Q it that are assumed to affect the thresholds and some of which may vary over time. The version of the GOP model that we estimate is based on the special assumption that the covariates in the threshold specifications are identical to those expected to influence health, i.e. Q it = X Å it and then μ itj = μ j + ω j X Å it . For identification and since the location of the underlying scale is arbitrary we need a constraint on parameters and it is convenient to fix μ 1 = 0 so that μ it1 = ω 1 X Å it . Using the standard normality of the ν it and the thresholds, the probabilities that individuals now report different health status can be found straightforwardly by using the cumulative standard normal distribution function Φ.·/. Letting Υ 1 = Υ − ω 1 , Υ 2 = Υ − ω 2 and Υ 3 = Υ − ω 3 these are
The standard probit model is nested under the restriction that Υ 1 = Υ 2 = Υ 3 = Υ: see Maddala (1983) , Boes and Winkelmann (2006) and Greene and Hensher (2008) . The GOP is estimated in STATA version 10 using the gologit2 routine that was written by Williams (2006) , which is downloadable from the STATA Web site http://www.stata-journal.com. The estimates of the GOP model above can provide predictions of health status which can be used to define health stock dummy indicator variables that are used in models in the next sections: HS 1it equals 1 if fair health and 0 otherwise; HS 2it equals 1 if good or very good health and 0 otherwise; HS 3it equals 1 if excellent health and 0 otherwise. The poor or very poor health category will be the baseline omitted category in the models. To explore the robustness of our empirical results, as well as dealing with the health stock in this way, we also estimate models where self-reported health is treated as an exogenous variable.
Labour force participation
Having generated the health stock dummy variables we initially consider their effect on labour market attachment (or participation), i.e. whether or not the individual is (a) attached to the labour market, either being employed, self-employed or currently unemployed but actively seeking work, or (b) not attached to the labour market, being for example long term sick and disabled, retired before the statutory retirement age of 65 years or engaged in family care.
Note that participation here includes unemployment. For the unemployed we cannot observe the true extent of their attachment to the labour market, so we explore two alternative definitions of participation based on differential classification of a subgroup of those individuals who are not working (see Section 3.4). We define an observed binary variable PART it = 1 if an individual is in the labour market at time t and PART it = 0 if not in the labour market. We take PART it = 1 if PART Å it > 0 and PART it = 0 otherwise where PART Å it is a continuous latent variable which determines the outcome regime modelled as
.
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With normality assumptions on the residual (ς it / this is estimated under the probit specification. We condition on the health stock dummy variables lagged one period, HS kit−1 , modelled via equations (1a) and (1b), and a set of controls that are included in the vector M it consisting of an intercept term, age, marital status, race, educational attainment, caring responsibilities, number and age of children and household size. The latter variables, the number of hours per week that the individual cares for others both within and outside the household, whether their partner is primarily responsible for child care, the number of children aged 5 years and under, and the number of children aged between 6 and 16 years, act as overidentifying instruments because they do not appear in the switch or wage equations (see below). The health dummy variables are lagged by one period to preclude the possibility of feedback from current labour market participation status to past health status, thus avoiding one potential cause of type I endogeneity, as described in Section 3.1. Contained in the vectorX 2i is the mean of all the time varying individual level control variables over time. Again estimates of parameters γ and π k in the model of equation (2) can be considered an approximation to a panel data fixed effects estimator with individual dummy effects rather than the individual means of covariates. From equation (2), where the error term ς it is assumed to have zero mean and a variance of 1, we calculate an inverse Mills ratio defined by
where φ.·/ and Φ.·/ represent the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions respectively. The inverse Mills ratio that is derived from estimation of model (2) is used to control for sample selection bias into labour market participation when we analyse wage outcomes by using modifications of expressions (4) and (5) below. Wage outcomes are observed only if individuals are labour market participants and therefore unless the probability of participation is accounted for parameter estimates in the wage equations will be biased (Heckman, 1979) . Hence the inverse Mills ratio is included as an additional regressor in the wage equations to correct for this selection bias.
The determinants of reservation and market wages
Our main focus in terms of labour market outcomes is to consider the determinants of both reservation wages and market wages, with a particular emphasis on health status. We adopt a full information maximum likelihood approach to estimate an endogenous switching regression model (see Maddala (1983) and Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) ). The basic idea behind the switching model is that the outcome in the wage equation can be the reservation wage or the market wage depending on a switch of regime, in our case unemployment versus employment. Endogenous switching models have been used in a variety of contexts within labour economics. For example, Ransom (1987) adopted this approach to model household labour supply decisions whereby the simultaneity of the participation decision of the wife and the labour supply decision of the husband are accounted for. Heitmueller (2006) modelled the public-private sector wage gap in Scotland via an endogenous switching approach. Finally, Garcia Perez and Rebollo Sanz (2005) adopted a switching approach to explore the relationship between job mobility and wage mobility. To our knowledge, the endogenous switching approach has not been applied to the analysis of reservation wages. It seems, however, particularly appropriate for the analysis of reservation wages at the individual level since the switching model sorts individuals into two groups: the unemployed and the employed. For the unemployed we observe their reservation wages, whereas for the employed we observe their actual wages. It is apparent that the samples of both unemployed and employed individuals are potentially non-randomly selected; for example, the high ability individuals are more likely to be in employment. However, selection issues have received very little attention in the empirical reservation wage literature. Some studies, such as Hogan (2004) , have included an inverse Mills ratio term in the wage equation, i.e. they have taken the Heckman (1979) two-stage approach to control for selection into unemployment, whereas other studies have not corrected for sample selection bias (e.g. Prasad (2003) ).
The endogenous switching approach allows us to estimate simultaneously a binary indicator that determines the outcome regime, unemployment or employment, and the continuous outcome variables in the model: reservation wages for the unemployed and actual wages for the employed. This approach yields consistent standard errors and relies on joint normality of the error terms in the continuous equation and the latent one underlying the binary response (Maddala, 1983; Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004) . Simultaneous estimation is particularly important for our application since it is apparent that reservation wages reflect employment status and observed employment status reflects reservation wages. For example, an individual with an unrealistically high reservation wage given his or her skills is unlikely to find a suitable job. Thus, the simultaneous modelling approach corrects for the selection bias in the estimates of the reservation wage equation.
Equations (4) and (5) which relate only to individuals for which PART it = 1 are estimated simultaneously, pooled across individuals i and time t, following Maddala (1983) , Lokshin and Sajaia, (2004) :
.5/ Expressions (4) for the outcome regime d it indicate the observed state for an individual whether that is unemployment or employment and gives a model for the underlying latent variable d Å it . Expressions (5) gives separate models according to which of the two regimes of unemployment and employment are operative with respective outcomes ln.w 1it / denoting the log-reservation wages and ln.w 2it / denoting log(actual wages). The vector Z it contains an intercept term and observations on variables that determine regime switching. K 1it and K 2it are vectors of observations on variables determining the reservation and actual wages and both contain terms for an intercept. γ, β 1 and β 2 are corresponding vectors of parameters. As in modelling health and labour market participation we proxy a fixed effects estimator by including the individual level group averages of all characteristics (including the inverse Mills ratio),X 3i ,X 4i andX 5i , following Mundlak (1978) and Martin and Smith (2003) . The error terms u it , " 1it and " 2it are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix
: : :
u is the variance of the error term from the selection equation, i.e. d it ; it is constrained such that σ 2 u = 1 to ensure identification of the parameters of the selection equation. σ 2 1 and σ 2 2 denote respectively the residual variances in the reservation wage and wage equations. The covariance between u it and " 1it is given by σ 21 ; similarly the covariance between u it and " 2it is given by σ 31 . Two coefficients of correlation can then be defined as ρ 1 = .σ 21 =σ 1 / and ρ 2 = .σ 31 =σ 2 /. If ρ 1 or ρ 2 is significantly different from 0 then the estimated model implies respectively that unemployed or employed individuals have a lower reservation wage (wage from employment) than a random individual from the sample would have. This is because if u it is positively correlated with " 1it or " 2it then those individuals who have a high unobserved propensity respectively to be unemployed or employed have a lower wage in their chosen labour market state than a randomly sampled individual. The standard errors in the endogenous switching model (equations (4) and (5)) must be adjusted to account for the inclusion of the estimated inverse Mills ratio (3) as an additional regressor which is a generated variable and will yield inconsistent standard errors. The inverse Mills ratio is included to account for the probability of participation; otherwise parameter estimates in the regime and wage equations will be biased (Heckman, 1979) . The variancecovariance matrix of the estimators should be adjusted via an appropriate procedure which encompasses all stages of the estimation procedure for the inclusion of a generated variable (Heckman, 1979) . Given that the two wage equations and the binary switching equation all need to have the variance-covariance matrix of estimators adjusted to provide consistent estimates, we bootstrap the standard errors of the three equations in the endogenous switching model by using 200 replications to gain consistency; see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) .
Model structure
To ease exposition, Fig. 1 presents the structure of the participation, endogenous switching and wage equations that were described above. The participation equation (2) is shown on the left-hand side of the diagram. The switching equation (4) and wage equations (5), on the righthand side of the diagram, are estimated only for those people who participate .PART it = 1/. Selection into participation is accounted for by including the inverse Mills ratio (3), estimated from equation (2), as an additional covariate in the switching and wage equations. For those individuals who participate and are employed .d it = 0/, we estimate a market wage equation, whereas, for those who participate but are unemployed .d it = 1/, we estimate a reservation wage equation. The switching and wage equations are estimated simultaneously by full information maximum likelihood.
This treatment of participation (or attachment) and selection is different from the approach that is normally taken in the literature, and this is made possible because we observe reservation wages for the unemployed. Most studies either exclude from the analysis those individuals for whom PART it = 0 (i.e. the bottom arm on the left-hand side in Fig. 1 is ignored) , or they include this group of non-participants along with the unemployed (i.e. the bottom arm of the leftand right-hand sides are amalgamated); these studies then only take selection into employment (versus unemployment) into account (i.e. selection is considered only in relation to the righthand side of Fig. 1 ). This may be inappropriate when investigating the relationship between health and labour market outcomes because health is potentially an important reason for nonparticipation; thus exclusion of those people with the weakest labour force attachment is likely to result in biased coefficient estimates in participation and wage models.
Note that our conceptualization of non-participation is different from unemployment; the unemployed in our model include only those who demonstrate some level of attachment to the labour market. In our first definition of unemployment (definition A) those individuals who provide reservation wage data and who classify themselves as unemployed are included as labour market participants. In our second definition B, those who classify themselves as long term sick or disabled, retired, in full-time education, engaged in family care or on a government training scheme, but who nevertheless provide reservation wage information, are also included as unemployed labour market participants; these people are classified as non-participants under definition A. Definition B arguably applies a less rigid distinction between those who are attached and not attached to the labour market.
Since we have reservation wage data for the unemployed we can estimate wage equations for both the employed and the unemployed, and deal with selection into labour market participation (including unemployment), which should result in more appropriate estimates of the effect of health on four different labour market outcomes: participation, the probability of gaining employment, wages and reservation wages.
Data and variables
We use panel data that are available in the first 14 waves of the BHPS, 1991 BHPS, -2004 . The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of private households in Great Britain and was designed as an annual survey of each adult member of a nationally representative sample. The first wave achieved a sample of about 5500 households, covering approximately 10 300 adults from 250 areas of Great Britain. Additional samples of 1500 households for both Scotland and Wales were added in 1999, and in 2001 a sample of 2000 households in Northern Ireland was also added. The same individuals are reinterviewed in successive waves and, if they split off from their original households, are also reinterviewed along with all adult members of their new households. The BHPS includes rich information on labour market status and sociodemographic and health variables.
We use an unbalanced sample of males of working age (18-65 years). The sample is unbalanced in the sense that not all individuals i are there for the full period T ; some individuals leave the sample, whereas new individuals can enter. Sample sizes are shown in the model structure diagram in Fig. 1 . Sample sizes are n = Σ I i=1 t i where t i is the number of occasions on which individual i is observed. The overall sample size n = 48 227 and the remaining subsample sizes depend on which definition of unemployment we use. Under definition A, where the unem-ployed are only those who self-report their labour market status as unemployed, PART it = 1 for n = 39 440 observations; and of these n = 37224 are employed observations .d it = 0/ and n = 2216 are unemployed observations .d it = 1/. For those n = 8787 observations in definition A for which PART it = 0, 38% are long term sick and disabled, 36% are retired before the statutory retirement age of 65 years, 18% are in full-time education and the majority of the remainder are on paternity leave, engaged in family care or on a government training scheme. Under definition B the unemployed group is larger because we include all those who are formally classified as non-participants who provide reservation wage information. Here PART it = 0 for n = 5756 observations and there are n = 5247 observations who are participating but not employed .d it = 1/.
The sections below describe the variables that are used in each equation and a full list of variables and definitions appears in Tables 1 and 2 . Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 (for variables in the participation and health stock equations) and Table 2 (for variables in the wage equations). Sample sizes for the health stock equation .n = 58 149/ and participation equation .n = 48 227/ differ as lags are introduced in the participation equation for health in an effort to control for simultaneity.
Wages
Equations (4) and (5) above show the specification of our endogenous switching model for outcome regime and wages. The defining feature of the BHPS for our study is that if the respondent 'is not currently working but has looked for work in last week or last four weeks or has not looked for work in last week or last four weeks but would like a job', he or she is asked to specify 'what is the lowest weekly take home pay you would consider accepting for a job?'. This is the net reservation wage w 1 of equation (5). The net market wage w 2 is defined as 'usual net pay per month' which measures the usual monthly wage or salary payment after tax and other deductions in the current main job for employees and self-employees, which we then convert to a weekly amount. It is notoriously difficult to measure self-employment income accurately; see Hamilton (2000) . However, in the context of the UK the BHPS has been used in several studies on self-employment, e.g. Gatherwood (2009) and Taylor (2001) . If the respondent is working we observe the market wage w 2 and if the respondent is not working but wants to work we observe the reservation wage w 1 . The wage variables are used in natural logarithm form in the estimating equations, deflated to 1991 prices. Hofler and Murphy (1994) questioned the validity of this type of reservation wage data, arguing that individuals may not be sufficiently well informed to provide meaningful answers. Interestingly, investigating the BHPS we find that the reservation wage data behave as we would expect. Individuals who have a reservation wage that is greater than their wage predicted on the basis of human capital characteristics, or greater than the actual wage prevailing in their region for the occupation that they are looking for work in, have a lower chance of finding future employment (Brown and Taylor, 2008) . In addition, Hogan (2004) showed that reservation wages of the unemployed in the BHPS adjust relatively quickly to macroeconomic shocks. This provides support for the validity of these data and we are confident that it has useful informational content on reservation wages.
Histograms for the net reservation wage .ln.w 1 // and net market wage .ln.w 2 // are shown in Fig. 2 . The mean weekly net reservation wage is £162 and the mean weekly net market wage is £215. Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the real mean net wages and mean SAH over time. Real mean market wages have increased by 7.7% from £208 in 1992 to £224 in 2004, whereas ‡Number of hours caring per week: 0, none; 1, 5-9; 2, 10-19; 3, 20-34; 4, 25-49; 5, 50-99; 6 , 100. real mean reservation wages have increased by 49% from £140 to £208 in the same period. This convergence may be partly explained by the introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 and welfare reforms following the change in government. Deterioration in mean health status to 2001 is arguably largely due to the increasing age of members of the sample, which changes in 2001 owing to a large sample add-in with a lower average age (for details regarding the sample see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps/about-bhps/ the-sample). 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 Year Fig. 3 . Real market wages, reservation wages and health by BHPS wave, for males (health status over the past 12 months: 0, very poor or poor; 1, fair; 2, very good or good; 3, excellent; the reservation wage is based on unemployment definition A): , mean reservation wage; ---, mean market wage; --, mean health, unemployed
Health status
The health stock dummy variables HS it that appear in the participation equation (2), switching equation (4) and wage equations (5) are derived as predictions from GOP estimation of equation (1). Here the observed health state H it is ordinal SAH derived from answers to the question 'Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been. Compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the whole been excellent/good/fair/poor/very poor?'.
This measure of SAH and many like it from similar surveys in other countries provides an ordinal ranking of perceived health status that has been used widely in studies of the relationship between health and socio-economic status (e.g. Jones and Wildman (2008) , Jones et al. (2006a) , Disney et al. (2006) and Contoyannis et al. (2004) ). Although the question wording aims to remove the age effect on health, this appears to be unsuccessful (Hernandez-Quevedo et al., 2005) , necessitating the use of age dummy variables in our health models (see below). A continuity problem arises with this five-point SAH variable because in wave 9 (only) there was a change in the question and available response categories. To achieve consistency over all 14 waves we follow the method of Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2005) and recode SAH into the following four-category scale: very poor or poor; fair; good or very good; excellent.
The vector X it of explanatory variables in the health stock equation (1) includes information on specific health problems. Individuals are asked whether or not they have any of the following problems with health: arms, legs or hands; sight; hearing; skin conditions or allergies; chest or breathing; heart or blood pressure; stomach or digestion; diabetes; anxiety or depression; alcohol or drugs; epilepsy or migraine; other. We create a binary dummy for the presence of each specific problem and, given the broad set of health problems that are included, it seems likely that we are measuring most of the important aspects of health. To cover all aspects of health, we also include a dummy variable reflecting whether or not health limits daily activity. This variable is not available in wave 9 of the BHPS, so we impute missing values by setting wave 9 values to equal wave 8 values.
The vector X it also includes a set of socio-economic characteristics that are assumed to affect health reporting behaviour. These are age dummy variables, with the youngest age category (18-24 years) as the omitted category, marital status, household size, highest educational attainment, with lower than General Certificate of Secondary Education education the omitted category, current labour market participation status .PART it as defined in Section 4.3 below), household labour income and whether or not the respondent is an immigrant or has a language problem that may have affected the BHPS interview. It might be noted that health stock as predicted by this model is itself included in the model for PART it . However, it is in lagged form, as will be discussed below, so that issues of two-way simultaneous effects do not arise. Also included in X it are year dummy variables which allow for fixed time effects; this might be appropriate as health status is not constant over time (see Fig. 3 ).
To check the robustness of our empirical results we also estimate models where SAH is assumed to be exogenous. Here we code the SAH dummy variables directly from the answers to the SAH question that were reported above. There are four health dummy variables: excellent, good or very good, fair and poor or very poor; the bottom category acts as the baseline.
Participation equation
The dependent variable for the participation probit equation (2) denotes whether or not the individual is attached to the labour market. The classification is taken from the response to the question on current labour market status, and we use two alternative definitions of unemployment which result in two alternative groups of participants (see Section 3.4). For individuals who are classified as employed, self-employed or unemployed, PART it = 1, whereas, for those individuals who are retired, on paternity leave, caring for family, in full-time education, long term sick or disabled, on a government training scheme or 'other', PART it = 0.
As well as the health stock dummy variables HS it that were defined above, the vector M it of explanatory variables in the participation equation also includes age, marital status, race, educational attainment, caring responsibilities, number of school-age and preschool children, and household size. Also included in M it are year and regional dummy variables; the former allow for fixed time effects such as macroeconomic shocks which might influence labour market participation, e.g. changes in the minimum wage; and the latter allow for fixed regional effects; for example individuals who live in certain regions may have a lower probability of labour market participation, i.e. live in deprived areas.
Switching equation
The switching equation determines whether the outcome regime is employed or unemployed, and thus whether reservation wages or market wages are modelled in the wage equation. As in the case of participation, d it is defined from the question on current labour market status, using our two alternative definitions of unemployment. For individuals who are unemployed d it = 1 and we observe reservation wages; for individuals who are employed or self-employed d it = 0 and we observe market wages.
As well as the health stock dummy variables HS it that were defined above, the vector Z it of explanatory variables in the switching equation also includes age, marital status, race, educational attainment, number of people who are employed in the household, number of children, household income from various sources (labour, asset and benefit), wage in previous employment, monthly housing or mortgage costs, labour market experience (years in unemployment in the reservation wage equation and years in employment in the market wage equation), the regional unemployment rate (from the Office for National Statistics) and, finally, the inverse Mills ratio (3) from the participation equation (2) to control for selection into active labour market participation. Also included in Z it are binary indicators controlling for size of firm, occupation of current employer if d it = 1 or in the last or previous job if d it = 0, and industry of current employment if d it = 1 or in the last or previous job if d it = 0. Such controls might be pertinent for example if the probability of employment differs across size of firm, occupations and/or industries.
Wage equations
The dependent variables are described in Section 4.1. As well as the lagged health stock dummy variables HS it that were defined above, the vectors K 1it and K 2it of explanatory variables in the wage equations also include age, marital status, race, educational attainment, number of people who are employed in the household, number of children, household asset and benefit income, household labour income (excluding own wage in the market wage equation), wage in previous employment, monthly housing or mortgage costs, number of years of current labour market status, the regional unemployment rate, dummy variables for size of firm, occupation and industry (of current main employment in the market wage equation and last or previous job in the reservation wage equation) and the inverse Mills ratio from the participation equation (2).
All variables which appear in K 1it and K 2it are also included in Z it and instruments that are used are obtained by non-linearities, and whether the interviewer observed that the respondent had problems during the interview process, along with dummy variables for region and year. Because the Mills ratio is a non-linear function of the covariates in the probit model, i.e. the switch, it is possible to have identical variables in the discrete outcome and the continuous outcome equations and not cause any problems of identification (Maddala, 1983; Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004) . To identify the effect of sample selection, non-linearities are formed from higher order powers and cross-products of all variables in the switch equation but are excluded in the continuous outcome equations (see Olsen (1980) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) ).
At each stage of the empirical analysis the Mundlak fixed effects approach includes the individual specific means of all time varying covariates, excluding year since this does not vary over individuals. The inverse Mills ratio which is included in the endogenous switching model is also incorporated in the vectors of meansX 3i ,X 4i andX 5i (equations (4) and (5)).
Results: baseline specifications
Interpretation of parameter estimates of the labour market participation equation (2) and the binary switch equation (4) is complicated by the fact that generally, for a binary outcome y under a probit model specification with a vector of covariates X and parameters β, the marginal effect of covariates on the conditional expectation will vary with the value of X, i.e.
where φ denotes the density of the standard normal distribution. In standard linear models these marginal effects are simply the coefficients β. Similarly, in interpreting a generic GOP model with y as the ordered outcome with category labels 0, 1, . . . , J − 1, again marginal effects on conditional expectations vary with the value of the covariates: Observations 48227 †ME, marginal effect; TSTAT, estimate/estimated standard error where standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping; additional covariate controls in the models for which results are not presented are year and region of residence dummy variables and individual means of time varying covariates. Panel (b) apart from health also has the same covariates as panel (a) but the results are not presented.
For j = 0, since μ 0 = −∞ the first term is 0, and if as usual μ 1 is set to 0 this reduces to −φ.β 1 X /β 1 . For j = J − 1 the last ordered category μ j = ∞ and the marginal effect reduces to φ.μ j−1 − β j−1 X /β j−1 . In a variant of model (1a)- (1b) we have β j = Υ j . It is to be noted that in aggregate across j the marginal effects cancel as might be expected and their sum is 0. This will be evidenced for example in the results in Table 2 . In interpreting the estimated discrete choice models we evaluate the marginal effect based on the mean of the covariates. Where covariates that are included in X are binary, i.e. X D , an approximation of the marginal effect is to take equations (6) and (7) as being broadly the same for when X D = 1 and X D = 0, in which case the marginal effect is the same as for continuous covariates; for example for binary outcomes the marginal effect is given by φ.X β/β D . Table 3 presents the results of the GOP models (see equations (1a) and (1b)) for health stock. For the health stock equations the sample size is n = 58 149 as no observations are lost because of lags (in contrast with the participation equation where health stock is lagged by one period in an effort to control for simultaneity). In general these results are as expected. A health problem that limits daily activity decreases the probability of reporting good, very good or excellent SAH and increases the probability of reporting very poor, poor or fair SAH; the presence of specific health problems works in a similar way. Time fixed effects which are also included as covariates are not reported for brevity but are jointly statistically significant. After conditioning on these health problems, age is associated with increased probability of reporting poorer SAH and decreased probability of reporting excellent SAH. Marital status and education reduce the probability of reporting excellent SAH, and although this may be somewhat counterintuitive it is explained by the conditioning on a comprehensive set of health problems, suggesting that for a given level of actual health those who are married or have better education are less likely Observations (definition B) 37224 5247 †COEF, estimates of the slope parameters; TSTAT, estimate/estimated standard error; additional covariate controls in the models for which results are not presented are size of firm, occupation, industry (of current main employment in the market wage equation and last or previous job in the reservation wage equation), and the individual means of time varying covariates including the inverse Mills ratio in panels (b) and (d) where we control for sample selection.
to report excellent SAH. Even after conditioning on specific health problems, labour market participation decreases the probability of reporting poor SAH and increases the probability of reporting good health.
In Table 4 we consider how health and other covariates impact on the probability of labour market participation, where participation is defined according to two alternative definitions of unemployment (A and B) that were described in Section 3.4. In panel (a) of Table 4 the full set of estimates is reported where the health stock has been generated as a prediction from the fitted health stock model (Section 3.1); panel (b) shows results from treating health as an exogenous variable directly observed from the SAH question. The estimated effects are presented only for the health stock variables. Focusing on panel (a) it is clear that health has a positive and significant effect on the probability of participation in the labour market and the effects are large. The probability of participating for an individual in good or very good health compared with poor or very poor health is 0.11 higher. This is similar in size to the effect of having a degree compared with no qualifications. In addition to these health effects, the individual is more likely to participate if he is older than the base age category (18-24 years), married (or living as a couple), has a degree or teaching or nursing qualification and his partner takes responsibility for child care. The probability of participation is reduced with the number of hours of care provided to another adult, and the number of school-age children in the household. Region and year controls which are included in the participation equation are jointly significant. If we use the alternative (less rigid) definition of unemployment, the basic story is the same with all estimated effects slightly smaller, except for the effect of the number of children under 5 years old, which is larger and significant under definition B. Where health is assumed to be exogenous in panel (b), i.e. instead of using the predicted health stock we use the SAH dummy variables coded directly from the answers to the SAH question in Section 4.2, the results for health are basically the same, with the estimated effects generally smaller (but still significant), suggesting that measurement error and reporting heterogeneity bias outweigh the other potential sources of endogeneity bias in self-assessed health. Lagged health has been used in these models as an effort to reduce the problem of simultaneous causation between health status and participation; however, if we use current health status, the results (which are not reported here) are very similar, with health effects larger than for lagged health as expected.
To provide a benchmark for the results of our endogenous switching model, and to facilitate comparisons with the existing literature, we present ordinary least squares estimates for the wage equations in Table 5 , where panels (a) and (b) refer to some results for the market wage and reservation wage equations, with and without controlling for selection into participation by using unemployment definition A, and panels (c) and (d) (2), is included as an additional covariate in both of the wage equations; and although the estimated coefficients are not reported here, they are negative and significant in the market wage equation and do not quite reach statistical significance in the reservation equation. Health has no statistically significant effect on the market wage, regardless of whether or not we control for selection and regardless of which definition of unemployment we adopt. This result is consistent with the findings of Contoyannis and Rice (2001) who found no effect of SAH on the wages of men, by using a panel instrumental variables framework to deal with the endogeneity of health. For the reservation wage, good and excellent health have significant positive effects when we do not control for selection into participation by using unemployment definition A, and this is contrary to theoretical predictions that people with poorer health would have higher reservation wages. However, the health effects are insignificant in all other specifications of the reservation wage equation, and in particular are insignificant when selection is controlled for. For brevity, the results where health is treated as an exogenous variable are not reported, but they are basically the same as those presented here, although the estimated effects of health are smaller and health is not a significant determinant in the reservation wage equation for either definition of unemployment. The other variables in Table 5 have the expected effects on wages and these are discussed in more detail in the context of the endogenous switching results below.
Having considered the ordinary least squares approach that is commonly used in the majority of the existing literature, we now explore how health affects wages allowing for endogenous switching between employment and unemployment. The results from the switching model (equations (4) and (5)) are shown in Tables 6 and 7 . Throughout the results which follow, sets of binary controls for size of firm, occupation and industry are jointly statistically significant in both the regime and the wage equations but are not reported for brevity. Table 6 presents the results with no control for selection into participation; the upper and lower panels show results for unemployment definitions A and B respectively and are comparable with Table 5 , panels (a) and (c). Table 7 presents the analogous results with sample selection controls included; and this is comparable with Table 5 , panels (b) and (d), though panel (a) presents full results. In Table 7 , the inverse Mills ratios are positive in the switching equation, suggesting positive correlation between the unobservables in the participation and switching equations, and negative in the market wage equation, suggesting negative correlation between the unobservables in the partic- Table 7 where we control for sample selection. ipation and market wage equations; the inverse Mills ratio is not statistically significant in the reservation wage equation, and its inclusion will cause a loss of efficiency.
When selection into participation is not accounted for (Table 6 ), health has a significant effect on the probability of being unemployed .d it = 1/, regardless of the definition of unemployment that is used. The effect is weaker for definition B, where only excellent health is statistically significant, compared with A, where both good or very good and excellent health result in a lower probability of being unemployed. For example, the probability of being in excellent health compared with poor or very poor health is approximately 0.16 lower for definition A, and 0.09 for B. However, once we control for selection into the labour market (Table 7) , the health effects become statistically not significant, regardless of the definition of unemployment that is used.
It is important to stress that our switching equation results can be compared with what much of the previous literature has termed the determinants of 'participation', since studies such as Campolieti (2002) , Kidd et al. (2000) and Jones (2006) deal with selection into employment contrasting this with non-employment, which may include unemployment and/or inactivity; they do not typically deal with selection into labour market attachment or economic activity, i.e. employment plus unemployment. The key issue here is that the estimated effect of health on the probability of unemployment depends on whether or not we account for selection into economic activity and, to some extent, which definition of unemployment we use. The bulk of the previous literature has shown that health does have an important effect on the probability of employment versus unemployment, whereas our results here show that, once selection into labour market attachment is accounted for, the health effect acts on the probability of labour market attachment and not employment versus unemployment, regardless of whether we use a strict or less stringent definition of unemployment. The other variables have the expected effects on the probability of being unemployed. The probability of unemployment is higher the higher is income from assets and benefits and the higher the wage in previous employment; and it is lower for those aged 25-44 years, those with more children and more people employed in the household; there is also a quadratic relationship with years of current economic status. It could be argued that benefit income is endogenous to our model; however, the exclusion of this variable results in very little change to the existing coefficient estimates.
Turning to the wage equations (Tables 6 and 7) , the results are robust to whether or not selection is controlled for, and to our definition of unemployment. For market wages, positive effects are found for being married (or living as a couple), having a degree, or a teaching or nursing qualification, having more children, higher housing costs, higher other household labour income and higher pay from last or previous employment. Market wages also increase with age, peaking in the 35-54 years age range, and there is the expected quadratic relationship with labour market experience. Significant negative effects on market wages are found from the regional unemployment rate and the number of employed people in the household. Analogous to market wages, reservation wages peak at age 45-54 years; they also increase with wages in last or previous employment. Increases in the number employed in the household, household labour income and the regional unemployment rate decrease the reservation wage. These findings are consistent with those of Prasad (2003) and Hogan (2004) , and they are also consistent with our ordinary least squares results (Table 5 ). There is little evidence that health has any effect on market wages or reservation wages. Excellent health does have a positive effect on the reservation wage by using unemployment definition A (Table 6 , panel (a)) but, when we control for selection into participation (Table 7) , or use the less stringent definition of unemployment (Table 6, panel (b) ), this effect disappears. The results for current (rather than lagged) health and for exogenous (rather than endogenous) health are not reported here but they are largely in line with the results of Tables 6 and 7, with one exception; when lagged health is treated as exogenous and unemployment definition B is used and we control for selection, excellent health does have a significant positive effect on the market wage.
Throughout the specifications that are shown in Tables 6 and 7 the coefficients of correlation, ρ 1 and ρ 2 (see Section 3.3), are statistically significant. This implies that unemployed or employed individuals respectively have a lower reservation wage or market wage from employment than a random individual from the sample. Furthermore, Wald tests of the null hypothesis of independence between the reservation wage and market wage equations are rejected throughout, hence endorsing the endogenous switching approach.
Conclusion
Our results show that health is an important determinant of whether or not the individual is attached to the labour market, and this effect is quantitatively important when compared with other factors like education, age and caring responsibilities. Those whose health is better than the base category (very poor and poor) have significantly less chance of having no labour market attachment. Once we account for selection into the labour market we do not find that health affects the probability of being unemployed (versus employed). In addition, we find no effect of health on the market wages of the employed, and no evidence for the argument that those with health problems will have higher reservation wages.
These findings are in contrast with those found in most of the existing literature, and this is likely to be because we can make a distinction between those who are not working but demonstrate attachment to the labour market and those who do not. The majority of existing studies cannot distinguish between a reservation wage and market wage effect on labour supply and can only observe the participation decision and the market wage for those who are employed; thus they are forced either to exclude those individuals who show no, or weak, attachment to the labour market, or to include them with the unemployed. This is arguably inappropriate because the unemployed, although they are not currently in work, do demonstrate labour market attachment; this is signalled in our study in two alternative ways: firstly by the individual stating that he is actively seeking employment or has a positive desire to work and secondly by specifying a reservation wage. The non-participating group arguably has a much weaker labour market attachment and we have shown that health is the most important reason for their non-participation. Hence, the main effect of poor health appears to be keeping people away from the labour market, but for those in the labour market, be it currently employed or unemployed, health effects are insignificant once selection has been addressed.
Our results have implications for policies that are targeted at getting the economically inactive back into work. We point to a clear distinction between those who are currently unemployed, but signal an attachment to the labour market, and those who are unattached to the labour market; and for this latter group poor health is the most likely explanation for inactivity. It may be that some of this group can work but getting them into employment will require co-ordinated health and labour market policy. It is important that policy is aimed at the appropriate target group and our findings suggest that tools to help people with health problems to enter the labour market will not be effectively provided solely via labour market channels such as Job Centre Plus in the UK (see http://www.jobcentreplus.gov.uk/); instead health care providers should arguably also be engaged in the process of bringing the economically inactive closer to the labour market. The 'Pathways to work' scheme in the UK (Department for Work and Pensions, 2002) , which aims to co-ordinate mandatory 'work-focused interviews' and capability assessment for new incapacity benefit claimants, goes some way towards this aim, but it is led by Job Centre Plus and can target only new claimants. In addition, the recent recommendation by the Black Review (2008) that general practitioners (GPs) provide 'well notes', which set out the tasks that a worker can perform, instead of signing them off as sick, may help some people to avoid joining the economically inactive group, but it will not help to get those who are already inactive back into a process of job search and eventual employment. However, the primary care channel may be one way to access the inactive group, via normal GP appointments. In our sample, this group has more visits to a GP than the active group; the mean number of visits per year for the inactive group is 2.8, compared with 1.9 for the active group, with 18% of the inactive group visiting more than 10 times per year, compared with just under 3% of the active group. Regular visits to a GP could be an ideal way of introducing work-related policy tools, either directly via the GP or via labour market advisors in primary care trusts. However, GPs in the UK do not normally receive occupational health training, so a significant investment in GP training or the availability of occupational health professionals in primary care trusts would be required.
